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Maritime Security and the Blue Economy: intersections and interdependencies in the 
Indian Ocean 
Maritime security is essential to supporting the Blue Economy in a range of significant ways. 
Many maritime security forums have been key supporters of the Blue Economy concept, 
particularly in the Indian Ocean region where security partnerships among a range of 
maritime nations have taken an active interest in articulating their role in addressing threats to 
ocean-based economic development. This paper will explore the co-evolution and co-
dependence of Blue Economy and maritime security agendas, with a particular focus on the 
Indian Ocean region. It identifies two primary interactions between Blue Economy and 
maritime security interests. Firstly maritime security is an enabler of the Blue Economy, for 
example through safeguarding navigation routes, providing important oceanographic data to 
marine industries and protecting rights over valuable marine resources and activities within 
claimed zones of maritime jurisdiction. A second, but often overlooked, role that maritime 
security operations and agencies play in the Blue Economy is by being itself a source of 
economic development and growth. An expanded Blue Economy will create greater demand 
for maritime security capabilities, and this in turn will trigger increased investment and 
growth in these capabilities. The enhanced and increasingly diverse role that maritime 
security will continue to play in the Blue Economy can be seen across all sectors in the Indian 
Ocean Region. 





The term ‘Blue Economy’ has increasingly become an integral component of ocean 
governance vernacular over the past decade, since it’s emergence at the 2012 United Nations 
Convention on Sustainable Development (UNCSD), or Rio +20 Conference. The concept 
was promoted at the Rio+20 Conference as the marine dimension of the broader ‘green 
economy’, which was defined as an economy “that results in improved human well-being and 
social equity, while significantly reducing environmental risks and ecological scarcities” 
(UNEP, 2011 p16).  The Blue Economy emerged to reflect the fact that over 70% of the 
earth’s surface is water. The oceans are crucial to global sustainability and play a key 
equilibrating role in global climate as the primary sink for excess heat and carbon present in 
the global climate system (UNEP et al., 2012). Indeed, the oceans are recognised as a vital 
repository and supporter of global biological diversity, and are a critical source of food 
through fisheries and aquaculture and are fundamental to the global economy through sea-
borne trade (Warner and Schofield, 2012 p.1).  
The concept of a Blue Economy has been particularly championed by Small Island and 
Developing States (SIDS) in recognition of their large ocean jurisdictions and the importance 
of ocean and marine industries to their national economies (Silver, Gray, Campbell, 
Fairbanks, & Gruby, 2015; Whisnant and Reyes, 2015).  Since that time there has been 
increasing interest in the concept of the Blue Economy around the world, yet the term is still 
employed differently in different contexts and there is no one universally accepted definition 
of what the Blue Economy is (Keen, Schwarz, & Wini-Simeon, 2017; Silver, et al., 2015).   
There is strong interest in sustaining and expanding the Blue Economy in the Indian Ocean, 
driven in particular by the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA) and individual countries 
including Seychelles, Mauritius, India and Australia (Llewellyn, English, & Barnwell, 2016; 
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Mohanty, Dash, Gupta, & Gaur, 2015; National Marine Science Committee, 2015; National 
Maritime Foundation, 2017; Purvis, 2015 p.226; Spamer, 2015). IORA makes a clear 
distinction between the concept of the Blue Economy and more traditional ocean and coastal 
economy models. They define the ocean economy as a segment of an economy, which is 
dependent on ocean for the inputs required for production. The ocean economy does not 
necessarily need to be located on the coast or on or in the oceans. The coastal economy, by 
way of contrast, includes all economic activities taking place on or near the coast and is thus 
defined in geographical terms. Finally IORA define the blue economy as a sub-set of the 
ocean economy, which ‘covers all ocean related activities including direct and indirect 
supporting activities required for functioning of these economic sectors, while adjusting to 
the costs of environmental damage and ecological imbalance caused due to exploitation of 
ocean resources for consumption. Therefore, the scope of blue economy is much wider and 
inclusive’ (Mohanty, et al., 2015 p9). 
Other definitions of the Blue Economy or Blue Growth have been established by the World 
Oceans Council, the Australian Government, the United Nations, the World Wildlife Fund, 
the Partnership for the Environmental Management of the Seas of East Asia (PEMSEA), the 
European Union and The Economist magazine, amongst others (East Asian Seas Congress, 
2012; Mohanty, et al., 2015; National Marine Science Committee, 2015; The Economist, 
2015; United Nations, 2014; Whisnant and Reyes, 2015; WWF Baltic Ecoregion Programme, 
2015). There are many commonalities across these definitions, with most incorporating 
economic, social and environmental objectives, and most highlighting a central role for 
innovation and integrated management in fulfilling these objectives (Keen, et al., 2017). 
Despite these commonalities, it is clear that the concept of the Blue Economy is fluid, and 
opaque (Choi, 2017; Silver, et al., 2015; Winder and Le Heron, 2017).  
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One of the enduring and critical questions often incorporated into discussions of the Blue 
Economy relates to its sectoral scope.  Given the Blue Economy is often thought of as a 
subset of the ocean economy, identification and valuation of the segments or sectors that 
make up the ocean economy is often the first step in the process of planning Blue Economy 
development or identifying potential Blue Economy opportunities (Colgan, 2016). A diverse 
array of ‘taxonomies’ of the ocean economy, such as the one outlined in Table 1, have been 
developed to assist this analysis (Kildow and McIlgorm, 2010; Alistair  McIlgorm, 2005; The 
Economist, 2015).  
[Insert Table 1] 
Questions remain as to what differentiates the ocean and Blue Economies in relation to 
sectoral scope, however it is clear that potential exists within all sectors to improve 
environmental performance and grow social and economic benefits. In this regard at least, all 
sectors have the ability to become more ‘Blue’ (Voyer, Quirk, McIlgorm, Azmi, & Kaye, 
2017).   
Maritime security, in common with the Blue Economy, is a term which is widely used yet 
poorly defined. In an analysis of the term,  Bueger (2015) identified four key ways in which 
the term ‘maritime security’ is understood. These included: 
 Sea power: the traditional role of maritime security agencies, particularly naval 
forces, in the protection of states, including patrolling and protecting sea lanes, 
claimed maritime zones and delimited maritime boundaries and coastal state rights 
within these maritime spaces. 
 Marine safety: addressing threats to ships and maritime installations and assets, 
including responding to maritime disasters and accidents at sea and participating in 
search and rescue activities. 
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 Economic development: enforcing laws and regulations in relation to resource use in 
the oceans, including countering piracy and smuggling and providing a secure 
maritime environment which enables and supports economic development. 
 Human security: in relation to ensuring food security and sustainable livelihoods, with 
a particular focus on Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated (IUU) fishing and human 
trafficking (Bueger, 2015). 
This paper will discuss the role that maritime security will play in the transition to a Blue 
Economy, with a particular focus on the Indian Ocean Region (IOR). It will begin by 
exploring the co-evolution of these two ambiguous concepts; ‘maritime security’ and the 
‘Blue Economy’. It will then review the ways in which maritime security is contributing to 
Blue Economy activities in the Indian Ocean, using the four categories of the ocean economy 
outlined in Table 1 to frame the discussion: i) Extraction of non-living resources, ii) 
Harvesting of living resources, iii) Commerce and trade in and around the ocean and iv) 
Ecosystem protection and management, with particular reference to the four categories of 
maritime security highlighted by (Bueger, 2015).  Finally, it will summarise and discuss the 
intersections between maritime security and the Blue Economy. 
2. The co-evolution of ‘maritime security’ and the ‘Blue Economy’  
The modern day concepts of maritime security and the Blue Economy both have their roots in 
two significant historical influences on oceans governance. The first was the substantial 
expansion of maritime claims seawards that was codified through the negotiation and drafting 
of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) (UNCLOS, 1982). The 
second was the broader sustainable development agenda, derived from the 1987 Brundtland 




The Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea took place between 1973 and 
1982, and saw over 140 nations come together to develop an international legal framework 
governing maritime rights and activities. UNCLOS provides for a 12 nautical mile limit to 
the territorial sea – something that had eluded earlier efforts at codification. Moreover, the 
concept of an Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), out to 200 nautical miles, gained general 
international acceptance. Indeed the EEZ concept originates from the Indian Ocean region as 
the term was first proposed by an Indian Ocean State, Kenya, in a working paper submitted to 
the African-Asian Legal Consultative Committee in 1972, just prior to the start of the 
negotiations leading to UNCLOS.  
The EEZ represents a compromise between the predominantly resource-oriented interests of 
coastal states and the interests of states concerned to preserve freedom of navigation. While 
freedom of navigation and overflight for vessels and aircraft belonging to other states are 
maintained, together with the rights for such states to lay submarine pipelines and cables, the 
EEZ delivers sovereign rights in respect of living and non-living resources to the coastal 
state. The potential significance of this expansion of coastal state resource rights offshore to 
coastal states was well recognized in the immediate aftermath of the negotiation of UNCLOS 
with a 1984 UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) report suggesting that 90% of 
marine fish and shellfish were caught within 200 nautical miles of the coast (Schurman, 1998 
p.107). Similarly, it was estimated that 87% of the world’s known submarine oil deposits 
would fall within EEZ limits (Churchill and Lowe, 1999 p.162).  
UNCLOS therefore both precipitated, and responded to, an increased level of attention and 
interest in the economic opportunities that might be provided by oceans and the resources that 
can be found within them. It was also highly influential in the changing role of security 
agencies and activities on our oceans. Maritime security has always played a central role in 
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protecting and developing economic assets and resource use in coastal areas and open oceans.  
This role has changed and evolved significantly, however, in response to expanded maritime 
jurisdictions, coupled with a shift in the nature and extent of maritime threats, such as the rise 
of terrorism and modern piracy (Bueger and Edmunds, 2017). 
Significantly for both economic and maritime security interests, UNCLOS has gained 
widespread international recognition and, at the time of writing, there were 168 parties to it, 
comprising 167 states plus the European Union. Of the Indian Ocean’s 36 coastal states, 32 
are parties to the Convention. The exceptions are Eritrea, Iran, Israel and the United Arab 
Emirates (UAE) (United Nations, 2017). Additionally, the two extra-regional states with 
Indian Ocean possessions, France and the United Kingdom, are parties to UNCLOS. The 
Indian Ocean littoral States have proved to be similarly enthusiastic in terms of claims to 
maritime jurisdictions meaning that broad swaths of the Indian Ocean are subject to EEZ 
claims and assertions of continental shelf rights. The latter have included full submissions or 
submissions of preliminary information to the United Nations Commission on the Limits of 
the Continental Shelf (CLCS) on the part of 18 Indian Ocean states concerning the 
delineation of the outer limits of the continental shelf seawards of 200 nautical mile EEZ 
limits (UN CLCS, 2017). 
UNCLOS has therefore both clarified and significantly expanded offshore rights. This has 
provided nations with rights over considerable marine resources and activities. Thus, with 
this increase in the scope of maritime jurisdiction came the right to access and exploit marine 
resources as well as to manage offshore industrial activities. Such novel activities provide the 
promise of new economic income streams through a range of developing marine industries 
including aquaculture, ocean energy production, marine ecotourism, carbon capture and 
storage and seabed mining.  
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2.2. Sustainable Development 
Around the same time as UNCLOS was being negotiated, there was a concurrent and 
growing awareness of the need to better consider the environmental impacts of natural 
resource use and extraction. The 1987 Brundtland report recognized the importance of 
development which accounted for the needs of future generations and the 1992 Rio Earth 
Summit advanced the notion of sustainable development – development which considers 
these needs through the consideration of social and environmental objectives, alongside 
economic objectives (Brundtland, 1987). In particular, the Earth Summit advanced the notion 
of a ‘Green Economy’, later defined as an economy “that results in improved human well-
being and social equity, while significantly reducing environmental risks and ecological 
scarcities” (UNEP, 2011 p16). 
The initial focus of sustainable development and Green Economy efforts and activity largely 
related to terrestrial systems. However, 25 years after the release of the Brundtland Report, 
SIDS began to challenge this focus and emphasized the importance of the ocean and coastal 
economy to their countries. The 2012 United Nations Convention on Sustainable 
Development (UNCSD), or Rio+20 conference, placed a heavy focus on the Green Economy 
and SIDS used this opportunity to highlight the importance of considering the marine 
environment within this model of development. They were the first to put forward the 
concept of a Blue Economy as the ocean based component of the Green Economy (Silver, et 
al., 2015; Whisnant and Reyes, 2015), and were successful in introducing this concept into 
increasingly common usage.  
2.3. Implications and intersections 
The historical development of UNCLOS and maritime security is interconnected in a number 
of significant ways. The ratification of UNCLOS has resulted in an increased awareness of 
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the enormous opportunity offered through rights over vastly expanded zones of maritime 
jurisdiction and the valuable marine resources and activities within them. The sustainable 
development agenda, coupled with the advocacy work of SIDS in drawing attention to the 
oceans, has emphasized the need for development to be environmentally sustainable and 
socially equitable. Both these development have resulted in a greatly enhanced, and more 
diversified role for maritime security commitments, as coastal states seek to protect and 
safeguard their natural and economic assets.   
The increased interest in the economic opportunities provided by the oceans has heightened 
the need for maritime spaces to be clearly defined and safeguarded, including through 
significantly increased maritime surveillance and enforcement requirements.  Maritime 
security has therefore evolved to expand beyond predominately naval defence of states and 
sovereign interests through military action, to include a range of additional roles and 
functions related to what is often termed ‘non-traditional’ threats (S. Bateman, 2016). In 
particular, significantly expanded maritime zones and marine resource-related rights, as well 
as increasingly diverse offshore activities, have created the need for substantially enhanced 
maritime surveillance and enforcement requirements. Maritime security is now a term which 
incorporates a diversity of actors - military and civilian, across both the public and private 
sectors – addressing multiple threats. Furthermore, even within the traditional defence forces, 
maritime security has evolved to extend beyond the military domain to incorporate additional 
constabulary and diplomatic roles (S.  Bateman and Bergin, 2009; Upadhyaya, 2014). In 
addition, with many threats and benefits crossing multiple maritime jurisdictions, security 
arrangements have necessarily become increasingly cooperative and have led to the 




Maritime security is increasingly playing a role in guarding against environmental damage 
and policy environmental regulations, such as Marine Protected Areas (MPAs) and fisheries 
regulations, highlighting the complex intersections with all aspects of the Blue Economy. The 
nature and extent of these intersections are examined in greater detail in the following 
sections, with a particular focus on the IOR. 
3. The role of maritime security in the Indian Ocean Blue Economy  
The Indian Ocean is a vast maritime zone covering 68.56 million square kilometres and 
incorporating coastal states from the southern tip of South Africa to the west coast of 
Australia (Upadhyaya, 2014). Thirty-six countries have access to the Indian Ocean, with vast 
differences in the cultural, social and economic conditions of many of these states. As the 
world’s third largest ocean, and with approximately one-third of the world’s population living 
in the Region, the Indian Ocean has significant potential to contribute to global efforts to 
combat poverty, enhance food security and provide for new economic opportunities 
(Upadhyaya, 2014). The Blue Economy is a concept which seeks to promote innovative and 
environmentally responsible development of these opportunities. The following sections will 
explore the role that maritime security plays, and has the potential to play, in these efforts in 
the region, based around four overarching categories of the ocean economy. 
3.1.  Extraction of non-living resources, or resource generation 
This category of the ocean economy relates to largely static, and geographically discrete 
operations such as oil and gas extraction, future deep seabed mining operations, water 
desalination, and maritime renewable energy such as tidal, wind or wave energy generation. 
The fixed nature of mineral resources, and the infrastructure associated with renewables, 
means that questions of jurisdiction are extremely relevant to this aspect of the ocean 
economy. As they generally occur within the EEZ or territorial waters of a state, their 
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management is primarily a coastal state concern. In part, this has been a significant driver in 
efforts from countries around the world to delimit their maritime boundaries, in order to 
clarify the extent of their maritime jurisdictions and thereby ensure that they have rights over 
any resources (living and non-living) that occur within their waters. For resources in the high 
seas, which are of particular interest for potential deep seabed mining and biotechnology, 
there has also been significant progress in defining the rights and responsibilities states that 
might wish to exploit these as part of broader negotiations around Areas Beyond National 
Jurisdiction (ABNJ) (see section 3.4.1).   
The management, expansion and growth of the Blue Economy in relation to the extraction of 
non-living resources, or resource generation are therefore heavily predicated on the clear 
articulation and resolution of jurisdictional questions. As noted above, UNCLOS provides for 
extended zones of maritime jurisdiction through continental shelf rights and the EEZ, and 
Indian Ocean coastal states have been enthusiastic claimants to these zones. Due to the 
proximity of other neighbours, many coastal states, Indian Ocean littoral states included, are 
often unable to claim the full extent of their maritime zones as set out under UNCLOS. The 
extension of coastal state claims has therefore led to significant areas of overlapping maritime 
claims and thus a proliferation in potential maritime boundaries. Where overlapping claims to 
territorial seas out to 12 nautical miles exist, Article 15 of UNCLOS applies whilst Articles 
83 and 73 deal with delimitation of the continental shelf and EEZ respectively. 
Unfortunately, these articles provide only limited guidance regarding maritime delimitation, 
meaning that there is ample scope for conflicting maritime claims and maritime boundary 
disputes. 
Here it can be observed that there is a marked contrast between the east and west of the 
Indian Ocean with regard to maritime boundary delimitation. While in the east over 20 
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maritime boundary agreements have been concluded and the maritime boundary mosaic is 
largely complete with the notable exception of the boundaries associated with Timor-Leste 
(see below), in the west by contrast only seven maritime boundaries have been delimited 
since 1976  (Prescott and Schofield, 2005 p.461-462). 
In part this disparity can be attributed to differing coastal geography. Although each sector 
contains a single large island – Sri Lanka in the east and Madagascar in the west, the eastern 
and western halves of the Indian Ocean are geographically distinct. The eastern Indian Ocean 
is characterised by major archipelagos, most notably that of Indonesia, but also the Andaman 
and Nicobar Islands group. These island groups are predominantly located towards the Indian 
Ocean’s mainland margins and there are relatively few isolated islands, although Australia’s 
Cocos (Keeling) Islands and Christmas Island are notable exceptions to this general rule. In 
contrast, the western part of the Indian Ocean features predominantly smooth continental 
coastlines, coupled with numerous small isolated islands and groups of islands such as the 
Comoro Islands group and islands scattered through the Mozambique Channel, the 
Seychelles, the Maldives, the Chagos Archipelago, Reunion and Mauritius (Prescott and 
Schofield, 2005 p. 461).  
Geopolitical factors also play an important role. Significant civil unrest in, for example, 
Somalia and Yemen, has tended to relegate maritime boundary delimitation to the back 
burner in a number of cases in the western portion of the Indian Ocean (Prescott and 
Schofield, 2005 p.462). Excessive claims to baselines along the coast from which maritime 
zones are measured are also a source of dispute (Roach and Smith, 2012). Similarly, the 
Indian Ocean features multiple sovereignty disputes over islands which, in turn, impede 
maritime boundary delimitation with respect to the maritime spaces associated with them. 
These island disputes include:  
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 Scattered islands in the Mozambique Channel: France retains control over a number 
of tiny island territories located in the Mozambique Channel, namely Bassas da India, 
Europa Island, the Glorioso Islands and Juan de Nova Island, all of which are also 
claimed by Madagascar.  
 Mayotte Island, whose population voted in favour of remaining under French 
jurisdiction when the Comoro Islands achieved independence, is nonetheless claimed 
by the Comoro Islands.  
 Tromelin Island, a small, uninhabited islet located approximately 280 nautical miles 
east of Madagascar and around 340 nautical miles north of Mauritius and Reunion is 
likewise under French administration but is claimed by Mauritius.  
 Diego Garcia and the Chagos Archipelago: Located in the central, northern Indian 
Ocean these islands are retained by the United Kingdom as the remnant of the British 
Indian Ocean Territory but are also claimed by Mauritius.  
While considerable progress has been made towards the delimitation of maritime boundaries 
in the Indian Ocean, many potential maritime boundaries remain undelimited. This is 
problematic from both Blue Economy and maritime security perspectives. Where overlapping 
maritime claims exist, the resultant uncertainty over jurisdiction tends to complicate ocean 
resource access and management. The sustainable management of marine living resources 
can be severely hampered where maritime boundaries remain unsettled and potentially broad 
areas of disputed waters exist. At the least, uncoordinated policies damage management of 
shared stocks while at the more severe end of the spectrum, potentially destructive and 
unsustainable competition for access to the resources in question can result. With respect to 
non-living resources, overlapping claims generally tend to prevent access to any mineral 
resources such as hydrocarbons as international oil and gas companies tend to be extremely 
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risk averse in the absence of fiscal and legal certainty and continuity (Schofield, 2011). For 
example, Australia and Timor-Leste’s longstanding dispute concerning maritime delimitation 
and joint arrangements in the Timor Sea has prevented development of the Greater Sunrise 
complex of predominantly gas fields worth an estimated $6 billion (Schofield, 2007). Happily 
there are indications that this dispute is progressing towards resolution (PCA, 2017). 
The IOR is therefore a clear demonstration of the reliance of successful Blue Economy 
development of safe, secure and peaceful resolution of maritime boundaries, and the potential 
for a role for traditional sea power functions in cases where this resolution is not forthcoming.  
Maritime claims, limits and boundaries define areas over the ocean where coastal states have 
rights and such rights need to be protected. This is particularly true for critical infrastructure 
and high cost fixed assets associated with the extraction of non-living resources, such as oil 
and gas platforms and renewable energy installations, which have potential to be at risk from 
terrorist activities (Mehdiyev, 2012 ). This places a significant burden on coastal states with 
broad maritime zones in terms of providing for adequate surveillance of their waters and 
enforcement where necessary. This burden has been offset to some extent by increasingly 
sophisticated technologies associated with monitoring and surveillance, or Maritime Domain 
Awareness, which has attracted significant investment in new technologies in the region (see 
section 3.3.3).  
3.2. Harvesting of living resources 
This category of the ocean economy relates to a variety of methods of living resource 
extraction from the oceans, including fisheries, aquaculture and marine bio-technology. One 
of the distinct challenges of this sector is managing transboundary, common property 
resources especially fisheries, which require a co-ordinated and multi-lateral approach. 
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Maritime security has played a particularly significant constabulary and diplomatic role in 
addressing threats to the effective management of these resources.  
Marine capture fisheries in the Indian Ocean represent around 16 per cent of global catches, 
with substantial growth in the eastern half of the Indian Ocean over the last decade. Three of 
the top 10 marine capture fisheries countries are in the Indian Ocean Rim (FAO, 2016 p.8). 
Fisheries account for a large portion of economic activity in many large and small Indian 
Ocean coastal states. In the Maldives, for example, fisheries account for 90% of exports and 
in Seychelles, fisheries account for over half of foreign exchange earnings (Michel, 2014 
p.111). Fisheries also play a vital role in livelihoods and food security. For example, 
inhabitants of Bangladesh, Comoros, Indonesia, Maldives, and Sri Lanka get more than half 
of the animal protein in their diets from fish (FAO, 2014). Ensuring the fisheries resources of 
the region are sustainably managed is therefore critical to the long term social and economic 
health of the region. Illegal, Unregulated and Unreported (IUU) fishing is considered a major 
threat to the ability to manage fisheries resources sustainably and to realize the potential of a 
Blue Economy. Despite this, monitoring, control and surveillance systems in the region are 
known to be weak, with fisheries governance fragmented across multiple organizations and 
agreements and, as noted above, the incomplete delimitation of maritime boundaries in the 
region (FAO, 2016 p.10-16; Michel, 2014 p.116).  
The transboundary nature of IUU fishing means that maritime safety and security is 
recognized as a priority area for regional cooperation. In 2015, IORA members signed the 
IORA Maritime Cooperation Declaration, which committed members to “address maritime 
challenges such as Illegal Unreported and Unregulated fishing” (para 5) including by 
“[e]nhancing coordination and communication between and among national maritime 
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agencies and authorities and other relevant fora…[and]…enhanc[ing] cooperation on 
maritime safety, marine environmental protection and maritime security.” (IORA, 2015)  
The development of a regional approach to managing IUU fishing remains in its early stages 
in the IOR but will undoubtedly require significant attention as countries look to grow and 
expand their Blue Economies. For example, since the settlement of maritime boundaries 
within the Bay of Bengal in 2014 (PCA, 2014; Schofield, Telesetsky, & Lee, 2013), countries 
such as Bangladesh have recognized the significant potential that exist within its largely 
unexploited offshore fisheries (Hussain, Failler, Karim, & Alam, 2017). Successfully 
exploiting this resource will require investment in appropriate vessels and fishing 
technologies to fish in remote and deep water locations as well as a cooperative surveillance 
and security activities between neighbouring countries to guard against IUU (Hussain, et al., 
2017). 
It is also well recognised that addressing IUU fishing requires addressing the systemic drivers 
of IUU fishing. In this regard maritime security actors play an active diplomatic role in 
supporting improvements in governance arrangements and the implementation of aid 
programs which seek to contribute to poverty alleviation and improvements in community 
wellbeing (DFAT, 2015).  
The exploitation of living resources therefore involves engagement with all aspects of 
maritime security. Competition for living marine resources in disputed waters (as outlined in 
Section 3.1) clearly has maritime security dimensions as, for example, confrontation between 
rival fishing fleets has the potential to draw in the maritime enforcement forces of the coastal 
states concerned with the potential for incidents to escalate towards conflict. This traditional 
sea power function is complemented by a focus on economic development and human 
security aspects of maritime security, which involves enforcing relevant laws and regulations 
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and addressing IUU from a both a diplomatic and constabulary perspective. Finally, marine 
safety functions are also significant for this component of the Blue Economy particularly in 
regard to search and rescue, which will be increasingly critical as maritime nations expand 
their interests into more remote offshore fisheries, as seen by the Bangladesh example.   
3.3. Commerce and trade in and around the ocean 
This category of the ocean economy relates to shipping and transportation, ports, coastal 
development and marine and coastal tourism and is the category in which maritime crime 
poses the most significant threat to a stable, and sustainable,  Blue Economy. Many of these 
threats cross national jurisdictions and therefore require a coordinated maritime security 
approach. Maritime transport is recognised as the backbone of the global economy 
accounting for over 80% of world trade, amounting to in excess of 10 billion tonnes of goods 
shipped in 2015 (UNCTAD, 2016).  The Indian Ocean hosts some of the busiest shipping 
lanes in the world, with 25-30% of global shipping movements occurring in the region 
(Llewellyn, et al., 2016). Approximately 100,000 ships transit the region annually, carrying 
up to a third of the world’s bulk cargo, half of the containers and two-thirds of the oil 
(Upadhyaya, 2014). This creates great opportunities and carries with it many potential 
threats. There is also significant capacity for growth in tourism in the region, especially from 
the burgeoning cruise ship sector. Cruise tourism is currently estimated to be worth 35.5 
billion U.S. dollars, yet the bulk of this occurs in the Mediterranean and Caribbean with only 
a small fraction occurring in the IOR (Statista, 2016). This is largely due to the volatile nature 
of security in the region. Growing this sector will require enhanced, and coordinated 
maritime security capabilities alongside careful management and maintenance of ecosystem 




3.3.1. Background  
There has been significant activity with the IOR designed to enhance and grow the potential 
contribution of commerce and trade to the region’s economy. While many countries in the 
region have ambitions to expand their interests in shipping and ports, the most ambitious 
plans for this development come from outside the region. The proposal by the Chinese 
Government for a One Belt One Road initiative (OBOR) has the potential to play a 
significant role in the future of the Blue Economy in this region.  Announced in 2013 by 
President Xi Jinping during visits to Central Asia and Southeast Asia,  OBOR aims to expand 
economic integration along corridors toward Central Asia, Europe, Southeast Asia, Africa 
and the Middle East (Blanchard and Flint, 2017 p.226). While information around this 
proposal is limited, its central platform is the development of six economic corridors based 
around two main transport routes: an overland link from China through Central Asia to the 
Europe (the ‘belt’); and a “21
st
 Century Maritime Silk Road”  through Southeast Asia and the 
Indian Ocean to the Middle East, Africa and Europe (the ‘road’) (ESCAP, 2017). The vision 
for the OBOR is framed around five pillars that reflect many of the same key principles 
espoused within the Blue Economy: green development, ocean-based prosperity, maritime 
security, innovative growth and collaborative governance. 
The Maritime Silk Road is aimed at promoting the expansion of coastal economies and 
maritime ‘clusters’ akin to special economic zones (Walsh, 2017) and developing 
infrastructure to support trade and trade routes across the Indian Ocean.  In particular the 
OBOR is relevant to Blue Economy developments in ports and shipping in the Indian Ocean, 
given its central position in the Maritime Silk Road and its overland links to sections of the 
inland ‘belt’ (D. Brewster, 2017; ESCAP, 2017). This has led to a growing interest, and 
investment, from China in the development of ports in the Indian Ocean (see Khurana, 2016).  
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The OBOR and the Maritime Silk Road are clear examples of the interaction, and sometimes 
uneasy relationship, that exists between the Blue Economy and maritime security. While they 
have clear economic drivers, the OBOR and the Maritime Silk Road may also have a 
significant influence on the security environment and geopolitical balance in the Indian 
Ocean. China sees OBOR as promoting economic cooperation between participating 
countries and boosting global trade more generally. This contrasts with the views of the US 
(and others such as India), who see it as a potential “geopolitical threat” (Blanchard and Flint, 
2017; Khurana, 2016). For example, Khurana (2016) argues that China will likely use 
economic (and humanitarian) drivers for a naval presence in the region (i.e. “military 
operations other than war”) as a way of legitimizing a strategic foothold.  
In February 2016 China commenced construction of its first foreign military base – a naval 
base in Djibouti. This is a further reflection of both China’s ambitions to spread its reach 
beyond its immediate neighbourhood and its strong interest in protecting its maritime trade 
interests in the Indian Ocean (Krupakar, 2017). Increasing economic interests arguably create 
the need to protect them, and it this is likely to lead to an increased role for maritime security 
in the region (Blanchard and Flint, 2017; Figliomeni, 2012).  
3.3.2. Threats 
Some of the most significant threats to the growth of ocean-based economies in the IOR 
relate to maritime crime including piracy, terrorism and smuggling. Somali piracy is perhaps 
one of the most striking examples of the potential impacts of these crimes on the 
development of a Blue Economy in the region. In the mid-2000s piracy off the coast of 
Somalia began to pose a major threat to cargo vessels, fishing boats and private yachts, 
building to a peak in 2011 when more than 300 attacks and nearly 30 hijackings were 
reported (Larsen, 2015). The impacts of these attacks on global trade, food security and 
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tourism were recognised by countries in the region but were a challenge to address. In part 
this was due to the transboundary nature of piracy, which required a coordinated approach, 
across a number of navies, coastguards, domestic judicial systems and the private sector 
(Bueger and Edmunds, 2017; Larsen, 2015). Piracy falls under ‘universal jurisdiction’ under 
UNCLOS, meaning that any state can intercept piracy suspects on the high seas. This allowed 
navies from around the world to apprehend suspected pirates. Amongst the private sector, 
armed security guards have been employed to protect vessels travelling in the region, raising 
coastal state security concerns (Schofield, 2014). This option has proved effective, however, 
as under these arrangements no successful attack has been recorded since 2012. The threat of 
piracy remains real throughout the region, however, particularly in areas marked by political 
instability and poverty (Larsen, 2015; Upadhyaya, 2014). Many of the cooperative 
approaches to managing Somali piracy have therefore remained in place, and in fact have 
been increasingly formalised in recent years (Bueger and Edmunds, 2017; McCabe, 2018).    
The IOR has additionally been considered a focus for potential terrorism activities, due to 
weak governance arrangements and known connections with Al-Qaeda in countries like 
Somalia. This has made the region a focus on US led anti-terrorism activities, with a focus on 
an increased naval presence in the region aimed at increasing surveillance and intelligence 
gathering. This increased naval presence is likely to have served as an additional deterrent to 
piracy activities in the region (McCabe, 2018 p169).  
In addition to threats associated with criminal behaviours, natural and human induced 
disasters are a significant risk to the Blue Economy in the IOR. The Indian Ocean has nine 
recognised ‘choke points’ for shipping movements. These narrow channels carry increased 
risks from piracy and terrorism but also create significant difficulties in managing traffic and 
navigation (Llewellyn, et al., 2016; Upadhyaya, 2014). Maritime collisions and accidents can 
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have profound environmental, social and economic impacts and therefore are a natural enemy 
of an effective Blue Economy.  
3.3.3.  Response to threats 
It is clear that commerce and trade in and around the ocean have the potential to play a highly 
significant role in the future IOR Blue Economy, but in order to achieve its full potential, 
significant maritime security threats will need to be addressed. Not least of the security 
challenges involve surveillance and monitoring to ensure effective deterrence and timely 
response to potential threats and disasters. Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) relates to the 
comprehensive knowledge of the situation at, or related to the seas, and consists of the 
combination of ‘situational awareness’ (or what can be observed at sea) and ‘threat 
awareness’ (or what threats are anticipated or suspected)(Rahman, 2010). It has become an 
increasingly prominent component of maritime security with the increased threat of terrorism 
but is also relevant to the management of other forms of maritime crime. For example, in 
response to the Somali piracy issue an information sharing platform named ‘Mercury’ was 
developed, which allowed the sharing of data in real time across naval and civilian operations 
(Bueger and Edmunds, 2017).  
The tools of MDA including vessel tracking data (such as automatic identification systems), 
sensors, satellite and radar data, customs and immigration information, intelligence, databases 
and environmental information (Bueger and Edmunds, 2017; Rahman, 2010). These multiple 
sources of data allow for a systematic and comprehensive understanding of a broad array of 
maritime related activities, including infrastructure and shipping channels, such as cargo and 
vessel movements (Rahman, 2010). Effective MDA also benefits Blue Economy sectors, as 
the data is often shared with Governments and the private sector (and vice versa).  For 
example, Australia’s Integrated Marine Observing System (IMOS) gathers regular physical, 
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biogeochemical and biological data relating to oceanic conditions which is then shared with a 
range of private and public sector actors to assist in management, research, development and 
commercial activities (Bergin, 2016).   
MDA is recognised to be a necessarily cooperative activity, incorporating data from public 
and private sectors, across both civilian and military actors and multiple jurisdictions.   
Cooperation is also required to manage the response to actualised threats. The Indian 
maritime security think tank, the National Maritime Foundation, identify the lack of a clear 
transboundary maritime security framework as a key challenge to providing the necessary 
protection for economic assets (National Maritime Foundation, 2017). To date the naval 
forces of the IOR have played a significant role in addressing many of the threats relating to 
piracy, terrorism and smuggling, with the Indian Navy playing a leading role in developing 
regional maritime security approaches. Somali piracy also provided for an increased role for 
countries outside the IOR, including EU and NATO member states (S. Bateman, 2016; 
Larsen, 2015).  
The Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS) was developed to facilitate greater cooperation 
and interoperability amongst the various navies and coastguards within the IOR and outside 
the region, and has 35 member countries including all 20 members of IORA (S. Bateman, 
2016; Upadhyaya, 2014). It is recognised, however, that the disparate and geographical 
vastness of the region, and the diversity of its economic interests, poses a challenge to 
regional maritime security architecture (S. Bateman, 2016; Upadhyaya, 2014). Instead there 
has been a greater focus on sub-regional organisations such as the Southern African 
Development Community, which includes a maritime committee, and the African Union, 
who developed an African Integrated Maritime Strategy (AIMS) in 2012 (S. Bateman, 2016). 
These sub-regional institutions have been actively engaged in negotiations around the Blue 
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Economy. For example, the AIMS has a particular focus on safeguarding the maritime 
domain for wealth creation and includes a proposal which explores a transboundary approach 
to economic development through a ‘Combined Exclusive Maritime Zone of Africa’ (S. 
Bateman, 2016).  
Commerce and trade in and around the ocean is a particularly significant, and increasingly 
prominent, sector of the Blue Economy. Its relationship with maritime security in unarguable 
– sea power and economic development functions relate to protection of shipping channels 
and safe passage of vessels at sea. Maritime safety and human security functions are required 
to prevent and respond to natural and human induced disasters at sea.   
3.4. Ecosystem protection and management 
While perhaps not traditionally considered a significant function of maritime security, there is 
increasing recognition of the role that maritime security will need to play in safeguarding the 
environmental health of the natural assets which form the basis on the Blue Economy. One of 
the most significant contributions of maritime security actors to the environmental protection 
objectives of a Blue Economy is through their constabulary role in enforcing environmental 
regulations, including laws which prevent dumping of hazardous materials at sea. In 
particular navies and coastguards are often involved in ensuring compliance with the 
regulations of MPAs, which are growing in size and number throughout the IOR. Whilst, 
from a legal perspective, this environmental protection role is a relatively straightforward 
undertaking within areas of national jurisdiction, there remain significant ambiguities around 
how the environment in ABNJ can be effectively safeguarded as Blue Economy interests 
expand into these areas.  
Over the past two decades, the international community has recognised the urgent need to 
conserve and sustainably use the enormous wealth of marine biodiversity in the vast ocean 
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ABNJ which make up almost half of the planet. The fragmentary international law 
framework and governance structure applicable to ABNJ and the rapid depletion of fish 
stocks on the high seas has provided the impetus for a process in the United Nations to 
develop an international legally binding instrument on conservation and sustainable use of 
marine biodiversity beyond national jurisdiction (ILBI). UN General Assembly Resolution 
69/292 provides that negotiations to develop the new ILBI (proposed for 2018) should 
address the four elements of a package deal agreed by States in 2011 (United Nations General 
Assembly, 2015). These elements comprise marine genetic resources including questions on 
the sharing of benefits, measures such as area based management tools, including MPAs, 
environmental impact assessments and capacity building and the transfer of marine 
technology (United Nations General Assembly, 2016 para. 3). The process initiated by the 
UN General Assembly (UNGA) Resolution 69/292 to develop the elements of the ILBI has 
the potential to contribute to a more integrated and cross sectoral system of oceans 
governance at a global and regional scale (United Nations General Assembly, 2016). Once in 
force, it also has the potential to enhance environmental and resource security across 
substantial areas of ABNJ including the Indian Ocean and will include much clearer 
articulation of the role that maritime security actors will play in ABNJ. 
The contribution of maritime security to the ecosystem protection and management aspects of 
the Blue Economy extend beyond enforcement of environmental regulations. They are also 
engaged in research and monitoring activities which increase scientific understanding and 
knowledge in relation to the marine environment, and are frequently involved in efforts to 
predict, prevent and respond to environmental disasters. Defence agencies regularly collect 
and monitor oceanographic, geographic, hydrographic and meteorological data as part of 
their efforts to build both situational and potential threat awareness through MDA (Rahman, 
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2010). This data also allows them to respond quickly, safely and effectively to natural and 
human induced maritime disasters.  
In the event of an accident or collision coastguards and navies are often first responders in 
terms of both human safety – through search and rescue activities – as well as environmental 
containment and impact management responses. This is also relevant to natural disasters, 
with defence services playing a major role in the humanitarian response to disasters such as 
the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami. 
Finally, there is increasing recognition that maritime security agencies must themselves be 
actively involved in managing the environmental impact of their activities. The Australian 
Navy, for example, has developed policies to manage environmental risks and limit impacts 
from their activities, including from waste, introduced marine pests and sonar activities, 
which have the potential to impact marine mammals (Department of Defence, 2016b).  
Moreover, technological innovations pioneered by Australian Navy, such as the renewable 
energy-based micro-grid being developed to power its base on Garden Island, Western 
Australia, HMAS Stirling, have been highlighted as potential options for small island 
developing states in the Indian ocean such as Mauritius (Opray, 2017) 
4. Discussion 
Maritime security forums in the Indian Ocean region have been key supporters of the Blue 
Economy concept. This support has taken a number of forms, including the development of 
security partnerships across a range of maritime nations focused on addressing threats to 
economic development from piracy and IUU fishing (David Brewster, 2014; Bueger, 2015; 
National Maritime Foundation, 2017). Table 2 summarises some if the key findings of this 
analysis in relation to the ways in which the Blue Economy and maritime security intersect. It 
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points to two clear functions that maritime security plays in the development and growth of a 
Blue Economy in the Indian Ocean region. 
 Maritime security as an enabler of the Blue Economy, and 
 Maritime security as a sector within the Blue Economy.  
[INSERT TABLE 2] 
4.1. Maritime Security as an enabler of the Blue Economy 
Maritime security is considered essential to supporting the Blue Economy in a range of 
significant ways, relevant to multiple sectors within the Blue Economy.  As outlined in Table 
2, all four elements of Maritime Security, as identified by Bueger (2015), were identified as 
occurring with the Blue Economy and Maritime security nexus.  
The traditional ‘sea power’ role of naval forces has been both enhanced and diversified 
through the increased emphasis on delimitation of maritime jurisdiction, and increased 
activity within and across claimed maritime zones. This is perhaps most dramatically 
demonstrated through the increased military presence of Chinese naval forces in the IOR as it 
expands its economic interests in the region through the Maritime Silk Road project. 
Maintaining peace and security through peace keeping operations, international diplomacy 
and aid programs play important roles in supporting the stability necessary for fostering and 
growing economic relationships, and protecting crucial trade routes, and navies will continue 
to be important in their traditional military role within the region. 
Navies, particularly the Indian and Australian navies, have also diversified their activities into 
non-traditional roles. Maritime security operations are often central to disaster response, 
search and rescue operations and maritime incidents, such as oil spills or accidents at sea. In 
this regard they play an important role in protecting human life and property, as well as 
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environmental health (DFAT, 2015; National Marine Science Committee, 2015). The 
importance of marine safety activities is especially pronounced in the IOR, given the region’s 
particular vulnerabilities to human and natural disasters. These vulnerabilities include a 
number of shipping ‘choke’ points, and coastal communities at risk from the increased 
likelihood of natural disasters associated with climate change, including low lying SIDS. 
MDA plays a key role in detecting maritime threats and developing strategies to avoid, 
mitigate or respond effectively to these threats and, in turn, protect the economic and natural 
assets which underpin the Blue Economy. The data gathered by maritime security agencies 
through these activities also provides critical information needs relevant to the Blue 
Economy, including weather and oceanic conditions, bathometric and oceanographic data and 
vessel tracking. This data, much of which is shared with industry and across jurisdictions, 
provides reliable and accurate information to assist maritime industries to plan and manage 
their business activities and provides insights into potential new opportunities for ocean based 
economic development.  
At its core maritime security is designed to provide a stable and secure environment in which 
economic development can occur and grow. Maritime security agencies contribute to the 
Blue Economy through their defence of important maritime assets and infrastructure against 
threats such as maritime terrorism. The link between economic development and maritime 
security is therefore fundamental to the Blue Economy. This has been demonstrated in the 
IOR through the role of maritime security in managing piracy, which has been seen to pose a 
significant threat to economic activities in the region in recent history. This role will evolve 
in the high seas as it responds to the future outcomes of the ABNJ process, as well as the 
resolution of maritime boundary disputes. It will also necessitate an increasingly cooperative 
approach as countries in the region seek to ensure the enforcement of laws and regulations 
relating to resource use across jurisdictions, particularly in relation to fisheries management. 
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Many of the maritime security measures designed to address economic development also 
have implications for human security, given they are considered important tools in ensuring 
ongoing food security and the development of new economic activities for some of the most 
impoverished countries in the world.   
4.2. Maritime Security as a sector within the Blue Economy 
The other important, but often overlooked, role that maritime security operations and 
agencies play in supporting the Blue Economy is by being itself a source of economic 
development and growth. As the Blue Economy expands and grows in response to concerted 
efforts within the region, there will be greater demand for maritime security capability.  For 
example, the activities associated with the Maritime Silk Road have been foreshadowed to 
trigger significant investment in port development and shipping in the region, and will require 
commensurate investment in security and defence. There will therefore be an increasing role 
for navies, coastguards and private maritime security agencies in an expanded Blue 
Economy, which will include policing maritime crime, conducting monitoring and 
surveillance and participating in search and rescue. This is likely to drive additional 
investment in shipbuilding and associated infrastructure within the region. For example, the 
Australian Defence white paper points to significant investments in amphibious vessels, 
offshore patrol vessels, frigates and submarines and includes a particular emphasis on 
innovation in these activities (Department of Defence, 2016a).  
Another likely outcome of an increased emphasis on maritime security within a growing Blue 
Economy will be the enhanced need for training and capacity development activities. This 
will be required to assist local countries to develop effective coastguard and defence 
capabilities, as well as the necessary skills and expertise to contribute to MDA activities 
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(Bueger and Edmunds, 2017). Education and training in maritime security is hence likely to 
be another ‘Blue growth’ industry in the IOR and beyond.   
The role of maritime security as a sector within the Blue Economy is difficult to quantify, 
given the wide array of industries it incorporates and problems with effectively defining the 
extent of maritime security operations across both the public and private sectors. For this 
reason it is often absent from attempts to value the current worth of ocean or Blue economies 
(e.g. see Australian Institute of Marine Science, 2016; Alistair  McIlgorm, 2005; Alistair 
McIlgorm, 2016). The full extent of the contribution of maritime security to global 
economies therefore remains poorly understood but is likely to be significant, and growing.  
4.3. Conclusion 
Analysis of the intersection of the Blue Economy and maritime security in the IOR points to 
the mutually co-dependent nature of both. The UNCLOS has resulted in greater attention on 
the economic potential of the oceans as coastal states seek to make maximum use of their 
expanded maritime claims. This has precipitated an increased and more diversified role of 
maritime security in the world’s oceans. The Blue Economy as a concept has evolved out of 
this increased interest in the economic potential of the resources contained within national 
jurisdictions. It recognises the importance of sustainable use and environmental protection as 
necessary to secure the ongoing availability of the opportunities provided by the oceans. It is 
also heavily reliant on maritime security to protect these opportunities from a range of 
threats, and to provide a safe and secure environment which enables the development of these 
opportunities.  With the increased role of maritime security, will come increased investment 
and growth of support industries, such as shipbuilding, suppliers of technology to assist with 
MDA and maritime infrastructure, such as ports. This, in itself, with generate new economic 
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Table 1 – Sectors that contribute to the ocean economy (adapted from The Economist, 2015) 
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Maritime security and the Blue Economy 
Table 2 – Matrix outlining the intersections between maritime security and the Blue Economy  
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